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Abstract
Stanley Cavell taught us that films give us a view of a world
that differs from the world in which we view films only by not
being that world. Films, that is, screen a world for us and
screen us from a world that is not our own. Cavell’s view is
based on a photographic conception of film images. A film is
composed of photographic images collected on reels and put in
motion at twenty-four frames per second. In “More of the
World Viewed,” Cavell dares us to come up with a theory of
perception that challenges the assumption that the camera
sees the world the way the eye sees it. Alva Noë has come up
with just such a theory. In this essay, we challenge the
photographic view of perception and the photographic basis of
film to argue for an enactive conception of film viewing. On
this conception, worlds in films are not viewed but achieved by
affordances picked up and skills refined in the course of an
embodied encounter with a world that includes films.
Additionally, in this skilled achievement of the worlds in films,
we also achieve something of ourselves. Ultimately, this view
preserves and enhances many of Cavell’s key insights in the
context of a new philosophy of mind.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
Stanley Cavell famously described film as “the world
viewed.”[1] We wonder whether this view of film is based on
a concept of viewing, a view of perception, that is misleading.
More to the point, we worry that the assumptions about
perception some of those following Cavell’s view may make –
and perhaps even Cavell himself – are not just misleading but
mistaken. A careful retelling of Cavell’s view of film seems to
show that it marries comfortably with what Alva Noë has called
a “snapshot conception of visual experience.”[2] Following
Noë, we can demonstrate that there are problems with this
conception, that it does not fit the facts of perception, and
that, to the extent he relies on it, this snapshot conception
distorts Cavell’s view of film.
We can also articulate and defend an alternative conception of
visual experience that preserves what is best about Cavell’s
view. By drawing on this alternative conception, we can
improve on what we understand about film and, also, what we
understand about ourselves as viewers of film, something that
is not obviously a part of Cavell’s view. In short, our aim is to
defend an enactive or actionist philosophy of perception and to
argue for an enactive view of film which avoids the pitfalls that
come from associating a view of film as the world viewed with
a snapshot conception of visual experience. In this way, and
at the same time, we aim to update and enhance many of the

insights Cavell brought to our attention in his study of film so
many years ago.           
2. Cavell
Cavell is at pains in his classic text to defend the position that
the medium of film is the real world. The real world is that
through or by means of which the world of the film is
represented. More helpfully, perhaps, as pigment and canvas
and stretcher bars are to painting, so, Cavell says, a
“succession of automatic world projections” is to film.[3] With
“succession” Cavell refers to “the various degrees of motion in
moving pictures,” including the movement represented in the
film, the contiguity of the motion picture frames, and the
juxtapositions produced by cutting and editing.[4] By
'automatic' he refers to the mechanisms of photography
responsible for the contiguous frames successively screened
and especially to the absence of a human hand in the creation
and screening of those frames.[5] 'Projection' refers to the
phenomenological facts of viewing the film, and 'world,' Cavell
writes, “covers the ontological facts of photography and its
subjects.”[6]
Clearly underwriting this intuition is a confidence in the
“fundamental fact of film’s photographic basis,” in the fact
that, as Cavell goes on to say, “objects participate in the
photographic presence of themselves; they participate in the
re-creation of themselves on film; they are essential in the
making of their appearances. Objects projected on a screen,”
he continues, “are inherently reflexive, they occur as selfreferential, reflecting upon their physical origins. Their
presence refers to their absence, their location in another
place.”[7] In this account, Cavell reveals, among other things,
his allegiances to the writings of André Bazin.
Writing about film's ontology, Bazin argued that the production
of the photographic image by automatic means alters our
psychological response to it. On account of this mechanism,
we are forced, he says, to recognize as real what is pictured in
the image by virtue of a “transference of reality from the thing
to its reproduction.”[8] The reality of the subject imaged,
according to Bazin, passes directly, is transferred to the image
of it. “Only a photographic lens,” says Bazin, because it is free
from human agency, “can give us the kind of image of the
object that is capable of satisfying the deep need man has to
substitute for it something more than a mere approximation;”
it gives us, instead, “a kind of decal or transfer” of the thing
imaged. “The photographic image is the object itself,” Bazin
declares. “It shares, by the very process of its becoming, the
being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the
model.”[9] Viewed from this perspective, Bazin concludes that
cinema or film adds time to photographic objectivity. Drawing
something of an analogy to painting, Bazin recommends that
just as photography successfully realizes the Renaissance ideal
of making compelling resemblances of objects in space, film
delivers Baroque art from its “convulsive catalepsy.”[10] Film,
then, on this view, gives us the real, moving images of people
and things in their duration.
So, Cavell can claim that the real world is the medium for the
world viewed on film because he accepts the view that film has
its basis in photography and because he accepts an ontology

of that photographic basis that has, following Bazin, a
distinctive feature, namely, that the reality of the subject in
the photograph has been peeled off or transferred from the
subject photographed to the photographic image of it. In
addition, Cavell will want to hold, also pace Bazin, that
movement in the world viewed on film is not an illusion
produced by the successive projection of photographs of the
world but a transfer of real movement from the world to the
cinematic image of it. We will not have time to explore
questions about the reality or illusion of movement in film,
though the conclusions proffered here give a clear indication
of how we might start to answer them. We will turn, instead,
to interrogate the photographic basis of film and the supposed
transfer of reality to the photographic image before going on
to ask whether this snapshot view of film captures the way the
eye views the world or film.
3. Bazin
In his argument for the transfer of reality from the subject to
the photographic image of that subject, Bazin is fond of the
example of family albums. From the pages of these collections
of photographs, Bazin says, we see the lives of those now
passed on or now past their prime staring back at us, their
lives and their vitality preserved forever. This observation is
not idiosyncratic. Some of us are old enough to have had
some of those older still present us with photographs taken
with the express purpose of preserving a remembrance of
them that would withstand the ravages of time. But we are
not convinced that all of these photographs are up to the task
of saving those pictured from the finality of death. Sorting
through a shoe box full of photographs not yet resigned to an
album, we often find images that do not preserve a
recognizable life at all, images of people we do not know or
who are not made memorable by this image of them, images
developed and saved just in case someone might find the
events or people captured in them memorable.
Families who preserve their photographic memories in slides
can enhance the reality supposed to be preserved in
photographs by projecting them, enlarged, on a family room
wall, sharing them with groups of people, increasing the
likelihood that a person or place pictured will be remembered
by someone in the group. These images will likely have been
selected from a contact sheet of all the images on a roll of
exposed film so as to make slides only of those images worth
sharing. It is apparently the case, then, that, on first
inspection, not all of the photographic images on that contact
sheet preserve a life. The images projected in the slide show
are those that have already survived a process of selection.
Today, that selection process, made easier by the option to
trash the digital image that does not measure up, is not
exercised often enough. Photographic images of everyone and
everything are taken and shared with friends, social media
“friends” and random strangers (assuming these are not also
social media “friends”). Even when they are taken with
professional single lens reflex cameras and not smart phones,
these images only rarely capture and preserve the reality of
their subjects. More often than not they capture cats asleep in
the sink, artfully formed steamed milk on a caramel latté, or
something a naked royal did that did not stay in Vegas.

The point of these examples is that the transfer of reality
Bazin attributes to photographs does not appear to be a
compelling ontological feature of photographic images in
general but only of a privileged instant captured and preserved
in particular photographs. The photographic lens does not by
itself lend to what we call photographs that magical quality
Bazin has noticed in certain photographic images. In fact, it is,
we suppose, widely recognized today that it is the nonautomatic presence of a human hand that captures the reality
or being of a subject in a privileged instant of it. A less
talented photographer, one without an “eye” for these
privileged instants, takes only random shots of people and
things that have no basis in the reality of their subjects at all.
Only the practiced photographer captures something of the
essence, the reality of her subject.
Moreover, that those privileged photographic instants cannot
be the basis for a film could be demonstrated by making a flip
book of these privileged instants, these decisive moments in
the life of a subject, whether a person, a bit of nature, or a
thing, thought to capture something real or even true about
them. What we would see in such a flip book would be the
shuttering image of its subject and those subjects presented
as associated with it. What we would see would not be real
but surreal bordering on the dream in which clearly imaged
people, places, and things are juxtaposed without a sense of
the order to which they might belong. We would see an
exaggerated flickering produced by the separation of these
privileged instants strung together in a syntagm detached
from the order or the whole that might connect them. Last
Year at Marienbad (1961) would look positively prosaic by
comparison.
The images we see on the motion picture screen are not
compellingly veridical because reality has been peeled off or
transferred from its subjects. The images flashed twenty-four
(more or less) frames per second (or their digital equivalent)
in a film are not privileged instants but the mundane,
ephemeral instants whatever of the subject as it happens to
appear or pass before the motion picture camera. This is not
just an aesthetic difference but an epistemological difference.
The images that show up for us in a film are ontologically
different from those that show up for us in a photograph, and
for that reason the cinematic image makes a different claim to
know its subject from what a photographic image does. The
successive images of Christopher Walken, to take just one
example, first contemplating a diagnosis of Parkinson’s
Disease in A Late Quartet (2012), eyes darting about to no
place in particular, turning his head to face different volumes
in the room around him, fidgeting in his seat, clearly
contemplating something profound tells us something about
his character that would have been conveyed very differently
in a photograph.
What shows up for us in the film as the image of a man alive
to and animated by the inevitabilities he faces would show up
for us in a photograph as the image of a man fixed and
consumed by his fate. Cindy Sherman has famously captured
this difference in her series of untitled film stills. What
distinguished those photographs as film stills is the openness
of the subject imaged to a whole of which that subject might

be a part. The subject, Sherman herself, is not so much
imaged as captured or consumed by her truth, as open or
directed to a truth that might complete her. That whole or the
truth is not given in the image. Rather, there is movement in
the image, represented as still, because that whole or truth is
neither given nor givable in it. This is a modern sense of
movement embodied by cinema that endows its subjects with
a quality or sense we do not find in the privileged and
remarkable poses captured in a photograph.[11] On this view,
film is not the mobilizing or temporalizing of still photography.
Film, instead, constitutes a new image whose reality is not
given (any more than it is in photography) but must be
achieved by the film maker and the viewer, both.
When Cavell says film is the world viewed, he means that what
we see on screen is not a representation of the world. It is the
world itself or a world different from our own only by virtue of
being screened for and from us. It is present to us by virtue
of its being absent somewhere. It is present to us because it
has been taken from where it no longer is. How does this
happen? It happens, according to Cavell, as a consequence of
the photographic basis of film and by virtue of an ontology of
the photographic image as given by Bazin. According to Bazin,
the distinctive features of this ontology are that the
photographic image is automatic, that no human hand is
involved in its making, and its being automatic gives it a claim
to being objective. In addition, its assumed objectivity is
supposed to make a psychological claim on us. But Bazin
appears to be wrong about this. The photographic image is
not automatic. It is not objective. It is not natural. It is
contrived and constructed according to a very specific code.
The reality of the photographic image is not a consequence of
a magic peeling. It is the effect of a very specific technique of
capturing a privileged instant. Does this mean that there is no
ontological basis for the world Cavell says we view on the
motion picture screen? No, it just challenges the notion that it
has its basis in what Bazin says is the ontology of the
photographic image.
Bazin attributed an ontology to photographs based on the
assumption that the camera sees the world the way the eye
sees the world. The camera sees the world, he thought,
objectively without any interference or modification or
imperfection or interpretation by the human hand or any other
artifice. The camera gives us, Bazin thinks, what we want but
what painting and drawing cannot provide, namely, a double
that will preserve the world from a second death. But the
camera does not see the world the way the eye does. In the
first place, this is because the eye does not give us a
photographic image of the world. In the second place, it is
because we do not see the world with our eyes. We see the
world with our whole bodies. And film is uniquely qualified to
picture for us the world we see or, better, achieve, using our
whole body.
4. Noë
This world viewed, or rather, as we want to say, achieved in
film is nothing other than our world, enacted by us in just the
way the world in which we enact worlds in film is itself
achieved. The world in film is not a presence given here

because it is taken from someplace where it is now absent, as
Cavell would have it. It is rather enacted or achieved from a
cache of affordances or resources for making or achieving or
enacting worlds. We enter the world on screen the way we
enter the world in which we find worlds screened, experiencing
not just its sights but also its sounds, its causes and effects,
its affects and aspirations, through a moving, living model of
that world. And this view of film and of the world in which we
view films is precisely what Noë says cannot be squared with a
“snapshot conception” of perception and experience.[12] On
the snapshot model, we perceive the world completely and in
full, vivid detail, the way the world is presented to us in a
photograph, in the sort of images which Bazin believes saves
its subject from suffering a second death. The idea behind the
snapshot theory is that we see the world, roughly, the way a
camera captures scenes from that world, more or less refined
according to the quality of the instrument and the materials
used, but complete and focused and stable, with the results
preserved in the developed print.
It has been known for a long time, of course, that this model
of perception is too simple to explain vision. Starting with the
anatomy of the eye, there is the fact that the image on the
retina appears inverted, that there are two retinal images for
the one thing we see, that there is a “blind spot” on both
retinas, that acuity fades at the perimeters of the retina
(where there are more rods than cones), that the eye is not
fixed but constantly saccading. And yet we say we perceive
our world as fully focused, stable and richly detailed, just as it
might be pictured in a photograph or in a motion picture
image. Traditional responses to these difficulties assign the
brain the capacity for overcoming the obstacles to the focused,
stable, and detailed view of the world we say we enjoy.
Skeptical responses attempt to show how the apparent
limitations actually contribute to the apparent effect of full
vision without jettisoning the snapshot model.[13] Noë points
to the limitations, especially saccading and faded acuity, to
reject the snapshot conception and to identify elements
contributing to a more adequate account of how we enact or
achieve the world we say we perceive.
For Noë, the world is not always already there waiting to be
viewed or perceived. The world is not given to us freely and
without cost. It is and must be achieved. Noë says, a world
“shows up” for us or becomes present for us only as a result of
the exercise of certain skills. It is the exercise of these skills
that achieves a world for us, that makes a real world come
alive for us. At the same time, Noë thinks, the exercise of
these skills gives us access to something about ourselves.
Using these skills, he says, we achieve ourselves at the same
time as we achieve a world. We achieve ourselves because, in
order to achieve a world, we enact the skills we have acquired,
practiced and refined for achieving the world we experience.
The world we experience is “our world” because it is the world
afforded us by the skills that define who we are and who we
are becoming.” Noë calls these “sensory motor skills,” and the
exercise of these skills, he says, is the key to the varieties of
presence we experience in the world.
On this view, enacting or activating the skills we have for
making a world show up for us achieves the world we perceive,

makes that world present for us, and in enacting those skills
we become present to ourselves as what we are, namely, the
composite or ensemble of the skills we have been afforded for
making a world visible to us. Already in the world, we enact
ourselves, act out ourselves, put what we are into action, by
activating the sensory motor skills afforded us for making that
world show up for us. The world that shows up is the world
we achieve by the exercise of our skills, and we have access to
precisely this world by enacting precisely these skills, that is,
the skills that define us as who we are. The result is that we
achieve the world just as we achieve ourselves, and we
achieve ourselves in order to achieve just this world. The
world, on the enactive model, is not a free presence waiting to
be viewed. The world is an achievement, a quite fragile
achievement, and this achievement depends on our enacting
ourselves, which is to say, exercising and mastering the skills
that make us, and the achieved world in which we show up for
ourselves, possible.
The skills we exercise and master are, Noë says, distinctly
sensori-motor skills. They are the kinds of skills we have
because we do not perceive the world with our eyes or with
our brain but with our whole embodied self. Thus we
overcome faded visual acuity and access the richness of a
visual field by adjusting our position, turning one way and the
other, peering around obstacles, putting on our glasses to
bring heretofore fuzzy areas of the visual field into focus,
attending to the many different details we experience in the
world separately and seriatim. Although from where we are
standing, we see only the curved surface of the tomato,
drawing on one of Noë’s favorite examples, we know that we
can pick the tomato up and examine its other sides, using the
sense of touch to perceive its volume and its density. And
understanding this, we perceive the tomato from where we
stand as the fully fleshed out fruit it is. The silver dollar or the
euro coin looks elliptical lying there on the table, but we
understand that were we to adjust our position, move our
bodies, pick the coin up and hold it in front of us, we would
perceive its actual circular shape, which we experience as
virtually present in its elliptical presentation from where we
see it now. At the same time, my familiarity with the handling
of produce and my attention to the apparently elliptical shape
of coins give me access to something about myself and the
practices and skills I have acquired and refined in the course
of becoming who I am.
We gain the skills that make the world present to us in this
way by collecting affordances, and we collect affordance, Noë
says, “the way we might pick up pebbles on the beach.
Perceiving, in this view,” Noë continues, “is not a matter of
representing the world in the mind. It’s a matter of exploring
the world and achieving contact with it.”[14] Noë takes this
view of affordances from the psychologist, J. J. Gibson. For
Gibson, affordances “are the possibilities for action provided by
things.”[15] “What a thing is,” Noë adds, “(as well as what it
invites, threatens, does) belongs to its affordances.”[16] On
these terms, following Gibson, not only the properties of things
but also their meaning and values can be directly perceived,
which is to say, achieved.[17] For Noë, this leads to the (for
him) radical proposal that we always encounter something
from a point of view and that “what enables us to achieve

perceptual contact with objects despite the limited and partial
character of our perceptual situation is our understanding
(sensori-motor and otherwise).”[18]
In his Varieties of Presence, Noë directly addresses the
presence in pictures. Pictures afford us, Noë says, in a way
that unknowingly echoes Cavell, a “visual sense of what is
visibly absent.”[19] Objects in pictures show up for us in a
way that is, for him, “qualitatively different” from the way they
show up “in the flesh.”[20] Noë rejects Mohan Matthen’s
suggestion that this is the result of an “optic ataxia,” that
pictures activate the ventral (or representational) but not the
dorsal (or practical) systems, because Matthen’s view depends,
with other mimetic accounts of visual experience, on a model
of perception that reduces what we perceive to an image in the
mind.[21] Visual experience is, for Noë, “always, already, an
action-sensitive awareness of how things are” out there in the
world.[22] What we perceive in pictures is not referenced to
an internal representation, an image in the mind, of what in
the world pictures picture. We see worlds present in pictures
the way we see the world, by a kind of “skillful probing with
our bodies,” by what Noë calls “styles of exploration.”[23]
And there will be styles specific to the experience of and skills
for accessing photographs and films.
More precisely, we explore worlds in pictures because pictures
“go proxy” for a world and serve as its “representative.”
Pictures, Noë thinks, are substitutes. They model the world
and stand in for it. Models are not representations of what
they model. They are representative and relative to the
purpose for which they are constructed; and since they are
constructed and not given, their significance is necessarily
conventional, and the conventions for using and accessing
these models must be learned. Pictures are not natural, Noë
says. They are made and made precisely for those of us who
have the sensori-motor skills to access them. This theory
directly challenges the “automatic,” hands free quality of
Cavell’s photographic basis for film. It insists, in the way
Roland Barthes insists, that the seeming natural immediacy of
the photograph is a myth.[24] As Noë sees it, “the apparent
immediacy and transparency of pictures is, in fact, an illusion,
itself an artifact of their engineering. We confuse excellence of
engineering [in photography and film],” Noë says, “with
naturalness and immediacy.”[25] We always see pictures, Noë
argues, in the context of someone trying to show us
something, and, on this view, the world in that picture shows
up for us only if it has been engineered for the skills (sensorimotor and otherwise) we have for achieving the world the one
showing it to us wants us to perceive.
5. The world achieved
These conclusions pose less of a challenge for Cavell’s view
than it might seem at first. They certainly challenge the idea
of film as a world viewed, but they allow that there is a world
in film just insofar as it is engineered by the skilled artistry of
film-making and achieved by audiences with the skills afforded
them in their viewing of films by that artistry. They challenge
a mimetic or iconic view of film images, though it’s not certain
Cavell is committed to such a mimetic or iconic view, but
without invoking the conventions of a film language, which

would be anathema to Cavell. That the contents of a motion
picture are engineered to model a world we access exercising
many of the same skills we use to access the world modeled
allows, as Cavell would want, that we experience the sight and
sounds, causes and effects, affects and affinities of a world
that is present to us by virtue of its being absent and screened
from and for us.
We say “many of the same skills” because there appear to be
skills afforded us by viewing films that contribute something
more to our achieving a world in our experience of them.
Audiences for auteur films, for example, who have picked up
affordances and honed skills attending to the technical
mastery, personality, and core themes of a director will gain
access to the world in these films in ways and to an extent
that other audiences will not. Access to the world in such films
will vary with the skill of the film maker and the different
affordances picked up and skillfully exercised by audiences for
those films. Genre films, by the same token, remarriage
comedies, for example, some of Cavell’s favorites, are made
by specialized artisans for the appreciation of audiences
especially skilled in the viewing of these films. It is fair to say,
on Noë’s terms, that Cavell has acquired a significant store of
affordances and mastered the skills for accessing a world in
these films where happiness takes the form of people learning
what they truly need by growing old together.
On Noë’s view, Cavell’s considerable appreciation of Hollywood
romantic comedies and melodramas was not freely presented
to him but achieved by the mastery of considerable skills, and
we will have access to that same view and that same world
only by exercising as many of the same skills as we can
muster. Skillfully attentive to the same affordances Cavell finds
in these films, we can achieve something of the world of
Cavell’s Hollywood and achieve access to something of
ourselves in our encounters with this world. Where we find
ourselves at odds with Cavell’s view, it may be the result of an
incomplete skill set or it may be the result of an attention to
different affordances in the Hollywood and “neo-Hollywood”
films Cavell discusses. It may also be a consequence of our
acquisition and exercise of different sets of skills.
For example, we can achieve something of the world in John
Cassavetes’s A Woman Under the Influence (1974), certainly
neo-Hollywood by Cavell’s standards and, so, by those
standards, lacking a world, by a practiced attention to the blue
collar domesticity of the Longhetti home, to Mabel’s
unpredictability, to Nick’s volatility and passionate love for his
wife all afforded us by the attention the camera, the direction,
and the editing give to these details in the film. At the same
time, in enacting this world on screen, we gain access to
something about the ensemble of skills that define us, in part
by our familiarity with these ethnic and class specific environs,
in part when we come to tears watching Mabel rush to the bus
to greet her children coming home from school. We gain
increased access to the world in this film by the affordances we
have picked up in our familiarity with Cassavetes’ body of work
and with the skilled acting of Peter Falk, playing Nick, and
Gena Rowlands, playing Mabel. From our appreciation of film
acting more generally, we appreciate and enact the skilled
risks Gena Rowlands takes in her role as a woman not just on

the verge of a nervous breakdown but patently over the edge,
psychotic, and yet so full of love for her children that she can
barely contain herself with the joy of welcoming them home
from school, not because it is a special day but because it is
any day, whatever. And if we find ourselves moved by this
scene, we certainly gain access to something about ourselves,
not about our personal history with mental illness but about
the ensemble of skills and practices that relate us to borderline
mental states and that enact for us the becoming psychotic
that is a mother’s love for her children.
In another example, we achieve the world of John Nash in A
Beautiful Mind (2001) because director Ron Howard depends
on the kind of skillful attention to the film that ironically keeps
us from noticing, on first viewing, that the roommate, Charles,
only appears to John (played by Russell Crowe) and that
Marcee, Charles’s niece, as Nash finally realizes, doesn’t age.
We achieve or enact the world in this film by a style of
exploring or a skillful probing of what we take to be the
environs, physical and psychological, of a precocious student
at a prestigious American university. We are afforded access
to this world by the wardrobe and the props and the palette
which gives the film a patina we associate with a time gone by
(when students were in fact so precocious). We fail or refuse
to pick up affordances that would alert us to John’s mental
state and, as a result, to the point in the film where Nash’s
illness is disclosed, we see what John but no one else in the
world of the film sees. We share John’s psychosis because we
achieve it, on screen and in ourselves. We enact what we
have become by the acquisition and refinement of skills for
viewing films that, in this case, lead us to overlook the obvious
for the sake of what we, falsely perhaps, take to be true,
especially about ourselves. We also enact or question the guilt
that may be the source of John’s psychosis and achieve in
ourselves the guilt that might affect our own mental health.
If Cavell would not see a world in these films, as he says he
does not in Bullit, The Detective, In the Heat of the Night,
Petulia, and Pretty Poison,[26] it would not be a failure of the
films or of Cavell but a failure of fit between the considerable
resources Cavell brings to the viewing of films and the
affordances available to him in these films. The skills Cavell
has acquired and refined in his attention to remarriage
comedies and melodramas of the unknown woman may not,
perhaps, have prepared him for the distinctive volatility of
Frank’s and Mabel’s southern California life, the unmistakable
coherence of class, ethnicity, domesticity, and sociality that
compose that life, or for the intense isolation of ivy league life
that leads Nash, naturally, so it seems, to hallucinate the
companionship of Marcee and Charles. If we say we have
picked up the affordances and acquired the skills that allow us
to enact these worlds, and ourselves, we do not say we have
achieved these worlds completely or that our achievement
somehow surpasses Cavell. We say only that the world we
achieve, as the self we enact and engage, is a fragile
accomplishment of the skills we have refined and the
affordances we have collected in our experience of films and
the world that includes these films.
By the same token, following Noë, we would suggest that the
“readings” Cavell gives of remarriage comedies and

melodramas of the unknown woman are compelling precisely
because they are achieved by the exercise and refinement of a
special set of skills and the collection of especially rich
affordances. On this view, those films, as he sees them, are
not given to Cavell freely and without effort. The genres
“remarriage comedy” and, especially, “melodrama of the
unknown woman” were not out there waiting for someone to
discover them.[27] Cavell achieves these genres through a
truly virtuoso deployment of skills acquired and perfected by a
loving attention to these films and to the place of women in
these films. The skills Cavell brings to his appreciation of
these films are refined by his appreciation of the importance of
skepticism in philosophy as well as by his identification of the
importance of women in psychoanalysis and film.[28] This
tells us less about Cavell as a person and more about the
affordances Cavell has picked up in his practiced appreciation
of an extensive filmography and his patient survey of a vast
body of philosophical, critical, film theoretical, and literary
texts.
6. Conclusion
We have wanted to preserve, here, the unmistakable value
that Cavell gave us in suggesting that we find a world in film
and in the suggestion that the world we live in is the medium
through or by means of which we have these worlds on film.
We worried about the easy association of the concept of a
world viewed and a snapshot theory of perception. In “More of
The World Viewed,” the essay appended to the enlarged
edition of his classic text, Cavell challenges us to propose and
defend a theory of vision that defeats the view that the
camera sees the world the way the human eye does, that we
perceive the world with our eyes and that the camera shows
us the world as our eyes see it.[29] We have begun to
answer that challenge here without questioning the broader
conclusions Cavell aptly defends. Alva Noë’s concept of
enacted mind and an actionist or enactive model of perception
gives us the world on film in a way that avoids what seem to
be problems in classic models of perception and philosophies
of mind. At the same time, Noë’s view enhances the value of
Cavell’s conclusions by adding to the achievement of a world in
film the achievement of ourselves as the audience for film.
Noë’s view also offers the possibility of multiplying the worlds
and the selves, some more fragile than others, that there are
to achieve in the experience of viewing film. Cavell argues
heroically for a world in film that suits his own special
attention to the affordances and mastery of an ensemble of
skills for seeing worlds on film. We are looking for a model of
perception that advances on the classic model and that, in the
appreciation of films, opens access to worlds that might suit
the affordances and skills for a more varied audience for the
art of film.
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